EasyWork Hosting
Our own multi-tier hosting platform on Windows Server and IIS supporting .NET, PHP and static sites — we operate production infrastructure rather than reselling someone else's.
Visit siteServing the United Kingdom
EasyWork Solutions manages cloud infrastructure for UK companies from Surat, India, and runs its own hosting platform on Windows Server and IIS. UK infrastructure decisions are shaped by three things: where data may sit, whether you could detect and report a breach within the required window, and whether the recovery you pay for has ever been tested.
Cloud hosting for UK businesses centres on data residency and transfer documentation, breach detection capable of meeting a 72-hour reporting expectation, and tested disaster recovery. Practical questions are your real recovery time and data-loss window, whether access logs are retained long enough to scope an incident, and who reviews the monthly bill.
UK organisations frequently have a residency requirement, sometimes from law, more often from a customer contract or an internal policy. It is entirely manageable when established during architecture and disruptive when discovered afterwards, because moving hosting can require application changes rather than just a migration.
The related question is transfers. Even a UK-hosted application usually involves processors elsewhere — an email service, an error tracker, an analytics platform, a support desk. Each of those is a transfer to identify, document and justify, and the list is invariably longer than anyone expects when they first write it down.
We produce that inventory as a build artefact: what runs where, which third parties touch data, and on what basis. It is the document your DPO will ask for and the one your customers audit, and assembling it during a build is a fraction of the effort of reconstructing it a year later from memory and configuration files.
UK data protection law expects reportable personal data breaches to be notified to the regulator without undue delay and generally within 72 hours of becoming aware. The phrase that determines whether that is achievable is "becoming aware" — the clock is not much help if you would not notice for six weeks.
That makes detection an infrastructure requirement rather than a policy one. In practice it means centralised logging rather than logs sitting on individual servers, alerting on the events that actually indicate a problem rather than on everything, and access logs retained long enough to establish scope after the fact.
Retention is the part most often under-configured, and it determines how bad an incident is. If logs show precisely which records were accessed, the response is scoped and proportionate. If they were rotated away after a week, you must assume the worst case for every affected system — which turns a limited incident into a large notification exercise. Log storage is among the cheapest insurance available in infrastructure.
Cyber Essentials is a UK government-backed scheme, and for many organisations it stops being optional the moment they bid for public-sector work or supply a large enterprise. Even where it is not contractually required, it is a useful forcing function because the controls it covers are the ones that actually prevent commonplace compromises.
The areas it examines are unglamorous: boundary firewalls and internet gateways, secure configuration rather than defaults, access control and the principle of least privilege, malware protection, and patch management within defined timeframes. Nothing there is sophisticated, and that is rather the point — most compromises we are called about exploit exactly these gaps.
What catches organisations out is usually patch timeframes and unsupported software. A dependency or operating system past its supported life is an immediate problem for certification, and it is very common in UK SMEs running systems that were built once and left alone. We surface that during an infrastructure review rather than when an assessor does, because the remediation frequently involves application changes and needs lead time.
UK buyers, particularly in regulated sectors and the public sector, increasingly ask a question that infrastructure suppliers dislike: what happens to us if you stop trading, or if we decide to leave. It is a fair question and most arrangements answer it badly.
A credible answer has specifics. Cloud accounts are in the client's name rather than the supplier's, so access never depends on the supplier's cooperation. Infrastructure is defined in code held in the client's repository, so it can be rebuilt rather than reverse-engineered. Documentation describes what runs where and why. And nothing depends on a proprietary component only the supplier can maintain.
We build to that from the start, which occasionally works against us commercially and is the right way to operate. A supplier whose commercial position rests on being awkward to replace has an incentive that is directly opposed to yours, and UK procurement processes have become quite good at detecting it.
A large share of UK SME infrastructure runs .NET applications on Windows Server, frequently on versions several releases behind, occasionally on hardware or virtual machines nobody wants to touch. We run our own hosting platform on Windows Server and IIS, so this is familiar territory rather than something we would rather avoid.
The instinct when confronted with an ageing estate is to propose rewriting everything into something modern. That is usually the wrong first move. A more useful sequence is to get the existing application onto a supported operating system and framework version, make it deployable reproducibly, and get monitoring and backups working properly. That removes the immediate risk without a rewrite.
Only then is it worth asking whether modernisation earns its cost, and the answer differs by application. A stable internal system that changes twice a year may be entirely fine on a supported stack for years. One that the business needs to change constantly, where every release is frightening, is where re-platforming genuinely pays. Making that distinction saves UK businesses a great deal of money that vendors are usually happy to take.
We do not publish a price list, because a number given before understanding the work is a guess someone pays for later. These are the factors that actually move the figure in this market.
UK or EU hosting narrows provider and region options and occasionally rules out a managed service you would otherwise use, so establishing it early avoids designing against unavailable options.
Longer retention costs storage and determines whether an incident can be scoped or must be assumed worst-case. It is among the cheapest insurance in infrastructure.
Where Cyber Essentials or a customer security standard applies, bringing unsupported software and patch timeframes into line is frequently the largest single piece of remediation.
Getting an application onto supported operating system and framework versions is modest work. Re-platforming an application nobody dares change is a different order of project.
Infrastructure defined in code you hold, accounts in your name and documentation good enough to rebuild from costs a little more up front and is what makes leaving possible.
Our own multi-tier hosting platform on Windows Server and IIS supporting .NET, PHP and static sites — we operate production infrastructure rather than reselling someone else's.
Visit siteMulti-tenant SaaS we host and operate, carrying the availability, backup and upgrade obligations that come with other businesses depending on it.
Visit siteA production ERP run and maintained over multiple years, which is where our practical experience of restores, upgrades and incidents comes from.
Visit siteWhere data may sit, and which third parties process it on what basis, are established before architecture and recorded as a build artefact for your DPO.
Centralised logging, alerting on events that actually indicate a problem, and access log retention long enough to establish scope rather than assume worst case.
Supported versions, patch timeframes, least-privilege access and secure configuration reviewed against the Cyber Essentials control areas, since that is what assessors and buyers examine.
Ageing applications are moved onto supported versions, made reproducibly deployable and properly monitored before anyone discusses whether a rewrite earns its cost.
Environments described in code in your repository rather than configured by hand, so the estate can be rebuilt rather than reverse-engineered.
Cloud accounts in your name throughout, with a documented inventory of what runs where and which third parties are involved.
These apply to us as much as to anyone else bidding for your work.
Sometimes by law, more often because of a customer contract or internal policy. Either way it is manageable when decided during architecture and disruptive afterwards, because moving hosting can require application changes rather than only a migration. We raise it in the first architecture conversation.
Even a UK-hosted application usually involves processors elsewhere — email delivery, error tracking, analytics, support desk. Each is a transfer to identify, document and justify. We produce that inventory as a build artefact, because it is what your DPO asks for and what customers audit, and reconstructing it a year later is far more work.
Only if you would become aware in time, which makes detection an infrastructure question. That means centralised logging rather than logs on individual servers, alerting on events that genuinely indicate a problem, and access logs retained long enough to establish scope after the fact.
Because it determines how bad an incident is. Logs showing precisely which records were accessed let you scope the response proportionately. Logs rotated away after a week mean assuming the worst case for every affected system, turning a limited incident into a large notification exercise. Log storage is among the cheapest insurance available.
It becomes effectively mandatory the moment you bid for public-sector work or supply many large enterprises. Even where it is not required it is a useful forcing function, because the control areas it covers — secure configuration, least privilege, patching, malware protection, boundary controls — are exactly the gaps that commonplace compromises exploit.
Unsupported software and patch timeframes. A dependency or operating system past its supported life is an immediate problem, and it is very common in UK SMEs running systems that were built once and left alone. Remediation often involves application changes, so it needs lead time — which is why we surface it during a review rather than when an assessor does.
You continue without interruption, by design. Cloud accounts are in your name so access never depends on our cooperation, infrastructure is defined in code held in your repository so it can be rebuilt rather than reverse-engineered, and documentation describes what runs where and why. Nothing depends on a proprietary component only we can maintain.
Usually not as the first move. The better sequence is to get the application onto supported operating system and framework versions, make it reproducibly deployable, and get monitoring and backups working — which removes the immediate risk without a rewrite. Whether modernisation then earns its cost depends on how often the business needs to change that application.
A meaningful share of search in this market happens in a language other than English. These are the terms people actually use — we work with your translator for customer-facing copy rather than relying on machine translation.
Last reviewed 2026-08-06 by the EasyWork Solutions team.