EasyWork Hosting
Our own multi-tier hosting platform on Windows Server and IIS supporting .NET, PHP and static sites — we operate production infrastructure rather than reselling someone else's.
Visit siteServing the United States
EasyWork Solutions manages cloud infrastructure for US companies from Surat, India, and runs its own hosting platform on Windows Server and IIS. Two questions dominate US infrastructure work: can you produce the evidence your enterprise customers ask for, and have you ever actually tested the recovery you are paying for.
Cloud infrastructure for US businesses has to satisfy customer security review, provide disaster recovery that has been tested rather than assumed, and control spend that otherwise drifts upward. Key questions are your real recovery time and data-loss window, whether access logging is retained long enough to scope an incident, and who reviews the monthly bill.
Nearly every US business we take over infrastructure for has backups configured. A much smaller number have ever restored one, which means what they hold is an assumption rather than a recovery capability.
The failure modes are consistent and mundane. The backup captures the application but not the database, or the database but not user-uploaded files. It ran nightly and stopped silently four months ago because a credential expired. It lives in the same account and region as the system it protects, so an account compromise takes both. Or the restore works and takes eleven hours, which nobody knew and nobody has planned downtime for.
The correction is to perform a real restore into a clean environment, time it, and verify what came back. That produces two numbers every business should know and most have never been told: how long recovery actually takes, and how much data you would lose. Those numbers, not the existence of a backup job, are what your customers and your insurer are really asking about.
Selling to larger US customers means security review, and the questions are predictable: who can access production and how is that controlled, is data encrypted in transit and at rest, how long are logs kept, what is the incident response process, how are vendors and subprocessors managed, and how is access removed when someone leaves.
These are straightforward to answer when the infrastructure was built with them in mind. They are awkward when access is shared credentials in a password manager, logging was never configured to retain anything useful, and nobody has documented which third-party services touch customer data.
We build the controls rather than the paperwork: individual named access with least privilege rather than shared logins, encryption as a default, centralised logging with a deliberate retention period, and a documented inventory of what runs where and which vendors are involved. The documentation then describes something real, which is the only version that survives a follow-up question.
When something goes wrong, the question that determines the cost is not what happened but what you can prove happened. If access logs show precisely which records were reached, the response is scoped and proportionate. If they do not exist, or were rotated away after a week, you have to assume the worst case for every affected system.
That distinction is enormous in the US, where notification obligations and customer contracts frequently turn on the scope of what was accessed. Being unable to determine the extent of an incident is materially worse than being able to demonstrate it was limited.
Retention costs storage, which is why defaults are short and nobody revisits them. It is one of the cheapest forms of insurance available in infrastructure, and it is a decision to make deliberately before an incident rather than during one.
US cloud spend follows a familiar path. Infrastructure is provisioned generously during a launch when nobody wants to be responsible for something failing, and then never revisited. A year later the business is paying for capacity sized against a worst case that never occurred.
The contributors are consistently the same: instances larger than the workload needs, storage snapshots accumulating with no lifecycle policy, non-production environments running around the clock for teams who work office hours, orphaned resources from experiments nobody cleaned up, and data transfer costs that have never been attributed to anything.
None of this requires sophisticated optimisation. It requires someone reviewing the bill monthly with authority to change things, and a right-sizing pass a few months after launch when real usage is known rather than estimated. We do that as part of managing infrastructure and report what changed and what it saved.
Availability is where US infrastructure budgets are most often misallocated, in both directions. Businesses buy multi-region redundancy for an internal tool that could be down for a morning without anyone caring, and run revenue-critical systems on a single instance with no failover.
The useful exercise is to establish what an hour of downtime actually costs for each system, then buy accordingly. That conversation usually reveals that the systems are not equivalent and should not have the same architecture — which is a cheaper conclusion than applying one standard to everything.
It also surfaces the difference between redundancy and recovery. Redundancy keeps you running when a component fails; recovery brings you back after data is lost or corrupted. Redundancy does not protect you from a bad deployment or a deletion, which is why a system with excellent failover and untested backups is a common and uncomfortable position to be in.
We do not publish a price list, because a number given before understanding the work is a guess someone pays for later. These are the factors that actually move the figure in this market.
Single-instance with tested backups is inexpensive. Multi-zone redundancy with automatic failover costs meaningfully more and is justified only where downtime has a quantified cost.
Longer retention costs storage and is among the cheapest insurance available, because it determines whether an incident can be scoped or has to be assumed worst-case.
Building the controls is one cost; producing and maintaining the documentation your customers audit is an additional ongoing one worth planning for.
Managed databases and services cost more monthly and remove patching, backup and failover work. Self-managing is only cheaper overall if someone competent consistently does that work.
Unreviewed cloud spend drifts upward without exception. A monthly review with authority to change things typically pays for itself several times over.
Our own multi-tier hosting platform on Windows Server and IIS supporting .NET, PHP and static sites — we operate production infrastructure rather than reselling someone else's.
Visit siteMulti-tenant SaaS we host and operate, carrying the availability, backup and upgrade obligations that come with other businesses depending on it.
Visit siteA production ERP run and maintained over multiple years, which is where our practical experience of upgrades, restores and incidents comes from.
Visit siteWe quantify the cost of an hour down for each system before designing, because that number decides how much redundancy is worth buying — and it differs per system.
Least-privilege access per person rather than shared credentials, with a documented removal process, since this is the first thing a security review examines.
Centralised logging with a retention period chosen against incident-scoping needs rather than left at whatever the default happened to be.
A real restore into a clean environment, timed and verified, producing your actual recovery time and data-loss window as reportable numbers.
A review a few months after launch against actual load, plus lifecycle policies for snapshots and schedules for non-production environments.
Cloud accounts in your name throughout, with a documented inventory of what runs where and which vendors are involved.
These apply to us as much as to anyone else bidding for your work.
By restoring one into a clean environment and timing it. Common failures are mundane — the backup captured the application but not the database, or stopped silently months ago when a credential expired, or lives in the same account as what it protects. A real restore gives you your actual recovery time and data-loss window, which is what customers and insurers are really asking about.
Who can access production and how that is controlled, whether data is encrypted in transit and at rest, how long logs are kept, the incident response process, how vendors and subprocessors are managed, and how access is removed when someone leaves. These are easy to answer when the infrastructure was built for them and awkward when access is shared credentials in a password manager.
Because after an incident the cost is determined by what you can prove. Logs showing precisely which records were accessed let you scope the response proportionately. No logs, or logs rotated away after a week, means assuming the worst case — which under US notification obligations and customer contracts is materially more expensive.
Because it was provisioned generously at launch and never revisited. The usual contributors are oversized instances, snapshots with no lifecycle policy, non-production environments running around the clock, orphaned resources from old experiments, and unattributed data transfer. A monthly review and a right-sizing pass once usage is real normally pays for itself several times over.
It depends on what an hour of downtime costs for each system, and those costs usually differ enough that the systems should not share one architecture. It is also worth separating redundancy from recovery: redundancy keeps you running when a component fails, but it does not protect you from a bad deployment or a deletion. Excellent failover with untested backups is a common and uncomfortable position.
Managed costs more monthly and removes patching, backup and failover work. Self-managing is cheaper on the invoice and only cheaper overall if someone competent does that work consistently. For teams without a dedicated infrastructure person, managed is usually the better economics despite the higher line item.
You do, from day one. We set them up in your name and take access, rather than the reverse. Vendor-held infrastructure accounts are the most severe form of lock-in in this industry, and businesses usually discover the problem at the worst possible moment.
A meaningful share of search in this market happens in a language other than English. These are the terms people actually use — we work with your translator for customer-facing copy rather than relying on machine translation.
Last reviewed 2026-08-06 by the EasyWork Solutions team.